Still catching up on everything, so this is a comment purely on some systematic stuff related to sell pressure. Does not address all comments, as there are plenty of other great considerations between both proposals (simplicity, regulatory uncertainty, timing etc)
I largely agree with @grin on the questions to solve. The buffer will need more eventually, but a fraction of the 1.5% of tokens intended for the initial auction would solve that. And the 500k from the strategic round 2 should be used for POL for a baseline of liquidity.(begin to seed the ETH side). I would also like to proceed with balancer as I’m not sure that curve v2 pool parameters are well understood (also hard to set custom liquidity parameters for a token we don’t really have price info on, right?), and we have some initial balancer incentives lined up, plus a more effective bribe multiplier on balancer (which I hazard to guess will close the gap over time, but not quickly).
I will note, in most outcomes I don’t think it matters which proposal we use. If no one wants to buy GEAR, then both proposals end up in a similar place (GIP32 doesn’t raise much liquidity and then has to liquidity mine, thru straight up LMing or thru cider’s proposal, or another approach).
- Ie, if 1b tokens are sold by sellers and no one wants to buy em, doesn’t really matter what token launch proposal is chosen. The token price will drop, liquidity mining will be less effective.
- If 250m tokens are sold and ppl really really want all 1b, then it doesn’t really matter if we do gnosis auction or not.
- If 250m tokens are sold and people really only want 150m, then bad for token. In this scenario, removing 150m of sell pressure (by using Cider’s method) is better.
Note, what is being discussed here is token price, but purely from the perspective of how to minimize token sell pressure created by the DAO while achieving the goals/reasonings for unlocking the token and liquidity mining and allowing the market to buy/sell as they deem fit. Ie, goal is not “maximize token price” (which is why ideas like “lock everyone forever, burn GEAR” etc are not considered). I do want to note that gnosis auction does to some degree guarantee that demand is leftover due to the nature of how it prices the asset, but Cider’s method definitely helps a lot in a specific window of demand/supply - and that window is more likely in a bear market.
Another item I don’t think has been mentioned is that bribing. If we do liquidity mining, does take at least bi-weekly multisig transactions. Do we have a multisigner willing to take responsibility in queing those? Or a dev willing to build a tool to user a keeper or something to send the necessary GEAR each epoch?
I also want to toss out the idea of a public gnosis auction (take with grain of salt for now just documenting), ie anyone can supply the GEAR that currently owns GEAR that isn’t vesting. Would require a custom contract that at a minimum has to allow anyone to supply. Would be cool if individuals could set a minimum price. Combine that with the uniswap LPing (buyers recieve an LP token rather than GEAR, reserve a spread to pay LPers). Primary benefit here is that ppl are more likely to supply because they aren’t worried about underselling. Granted, if they are correct and they are underselling then most concerns are solved anyway. Ie, this may be a problem that solves itself, but it would make it easier to attract GEAR suppliers if there is worry that ppl that wish to sell think $0.015 is undervalued.