[GIP-31/2] GEAR Liquidity Raise and Enabling of Token Transferability

Pre-proposal discussion here: [OLD] GEAR Liquidity Raise and Token Transferability

EDIT 11/20 - updated circulating supply information (less circulating supply, more vested supply, accounting for strategic rounds being locked)

0. Intro

The purpose of this proposal is to:

  1. Officially target a timeline for making the token transferable
  2. Set parameters for the gnosis auction token sale
  3. Determine a home for protocol owned liquidity and the parameters for LPing:

Gearbox V1 was the minimum viable product - Gearbox V2 is the product that is ready to onboard users and start earning meaningful revenue. GEAR is the token that governs all of this. Therefore, this is the perfect time to bring back discussion around if, why, when, and how to enable the GEAR token to be transferable.

You can view this document in google docs form, as well as previous versions, here

1. Skip the reasoning, gimme the specs

A vote “FOR” this proposal would signal approval for the following token launch plan:

  1. Target enabling token transferability between Dec 1st and 10th, 2022.
  2. Approximately 1 week before transferability is enabled, host a liquidity fundraise token sale. Sell 1.5% of the token supply. Utilize a gnosis batch auction executed thru the gnosis multisig auction application, with the following parameters:
Parameter Value Unit
Auctioning Token 0xBa3335588D9403515223F109EdC4eB7269a9Ab5D GEAR contract
Bidding Token 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 USDC Contract
Sell Amount 150000000 GEAR tokens
Minimum Buy Amount $0.015 x 150m GEAR USDC
Minimum Funding Threshold 0 USDC
Order Cancelation End Time Start Date/Time plus 12 hours Month, Day, Year, Time
Auction End Time Start Date/Time plus 72 hours Month, Day, Year, Time
Minimal Bidding-Amount Per Order 10000 GEAR tokens
Atomic Closure Allowance No (Unchecked) Checkbox
Whitelisting Process No (Unchecked) Checkbox
Miner Role Gnosis Auction Contract Role bestowed by multisig
Whitelist Contract none n/a
  1. Pair the proceeds from the sale with an additional 1.5% of circulating supply and provide liquidity on Balancer.

  2. If raised funds are less than $2,000,000, create a separate proposal to determine best path to obtain more liquidity (liquidity mine uni v2 LP positions, or supplement from strategic raise round 2).

2. Determination of Timing

The base assumption is that eventually, the GEAR token needs to be transferable. There are multiple factors that play into the timing of the token launch.

Benefits of an Unlocked Token

There are a few benefits of an unlocked token:

  1. It is easier for contributors and others that wish to become active to gain a financial interest in the protocol.
  2. Liquidity mining is more effective as LPers and users do not have to try to price unknown value / timeframes.
  3. Contributors have the flexibility to adjust their payments each month to skew towards/away from gov tokens depending on financial needs/planning, without needing to ask for adjusted pay each month (ie, contributors can customize the % of their income that’s in GEAR vs stables)
  4. Token price feeds become feasible, which allows for use cases such as portfolio margin to be integrated, allows liquidations to be more efficient and less costly, and allows for GEAR integrations with other protocols.

Token Utility, Regulations, and Product Growth

Currently, when tokens unlock, holders will have 4 options: Sell, Hold, Buy more, or Provide Liquidity. Ultimately these are all forms of Buy, or Hold. Those that choose to hold the token are likely expecting a future return. The longer it takes to unlock the token, the more time Gearbox has to create this future return. However:

  1. In their short history, DeFi protocols have usually taken a few years to find product market fit and proven sustainable profitability.
  2. Even if Gearbox does find product market fit sooner, there is no guarantee that this value is immediately transferred to the token.
  3. Regulatory uncertainty creates even more of an unpredictable timeline on these items
  4. Revenue share in the growth phase of a protocol is generally not good for the long term success of the protocol.

The primary point is that there is no hard timeline on when Gearbox will start earning significant revenue, and then there is no hard timeline after that on when that value could transfer to token holders. That could lead to a scenario where two years from now GEAR is still a valueless governance token that does not benefit from the success of the protocol. At that point, if the token were to be unlocked, then 2 years would have been spent without the benefits of an unlocked token just for a big old nothing-burger of an unlock event, where holders still only have the option to sell or continue holding.

There are potential ways around this, such as direct utility of the GEAR token as cross-margin or other benefits for users. However, this still requires GEAR to find PMF (utility without revenue is akin to lipstick on a manatee, with sailors that have been at sea too long and slowly sober up. Or, to put that less ridiculously - it just creates hype / wealth transfer games that benefit those that understand early and eventually get figured out).

Vested Token Unlocks

Currently 29.2% of the supply is owned by early contributors and ex-core, with a 1 year linear vest beginning Dec 15th, 2022. Launching the token after this vest begins would potentially create bad optics for the DAO (tokens that were meant to be locked are instead effectively unlocked with every other token, though the vest will mean there won’t be immediate large unlocks).

Gearbox V2 Hype

Launching into the hype of Gearbox V2 gives the DAO a better chance at having an efficient token sale and liquidity launch. There is risk of creating FOMO (and thus unhappy community member bag holders), however current market conditions will likely dampen this significantly. The token launch is also set a few weeks after V2 launches in order to give the crypto community time to fairly evaluate Gearbox V2.

Liquidity Mining

As mentioned above, liquidity mining is more efficient with a liquid token. Some depositors have expressed that earning yield on lending is less desirable with an uncertain unlock timeline. The liquidity mining event would likely not launch with V2, to let V2 scale up a bit prior to bringing significant TVL. This means its acceptable for the token launch to also not occur with the launch of V2. Additionally, devs would probably kill the community if it voted to launch liquidity mining and the token event at the same time as V2.

3. Sizing Liquidity Relative to Circulating Supply

The current state of GEAR tokens is as follows:

  • 20% for early contributors/initial core, 1 year linear vest beginning Dec 15th 2022
  • 9.2% for current contributors, 1 year lock beginning approx end of Nov 2022.
  • 1.933% to Discordoor and Testoors and retroactive payment round (1% discord, 0.5% testoor, 0.5% retroactive)
  • 5% to Credit Account mining
  • 1.4m gear tech multisig [negligible]
  • 3.766% to Strategic Funding Round (1 year cliff, 1 year vest)
  • 0.79% Strategic Funding Round 2 (1 year cliff, 1 year vest)
  • 1% Liquidity Mining (%is after 3 months of liquidity mining)
  • [Proposed] 0.04% per month in contributor payments + tech multisig

When adding in the proposed 3% for liquidity and consolidating categories, that leads to:

  • ~9.75% “circulating” (ie, no vesting) supply (once 3 month LM concludes)
  • 33.8% vested (20% starts vesting Dec 15th)
  • 54.95% DAO
  • 1.5% in liquidity pool

Note: total supply of GEAR is 10 billion

The current FDV per the vested fundraising rounds are $150m. We will keep this same valuation to make a funded auction a more likely outcome, but the market is free to price GEAR higher to than 150m FDV to account for the fact these tokens will be unvested. With 10% of supply circulating, that leads to a circulating market cap of $15m. 1.5% of supply would be $2.25m of liquidity, paired with ETH, for $4.5m total. This means 13% of circulating supply would be able to be sold into protocol-owned liquidity, in absence of other liquidity providers and buyers. This means that dumpoors will need to find willing buyers or sell GEAR back to the DAO at a cheaper cost than was likely paid for it (thus saving the DAO money on credit account creation). Separately, this also means only 1.5% of the total supply, or 13% of circulating supply, is available for purchase on the open market from the DAO.

This is also a decent liquidity base to build from for eventual listings on centralized exchanges, if desired (comparable to other current cycle DeFi protocols, good example being GMX which has ~4x the FDV and ~4x the liquidity). The liquidity would also be slightly more effective if it was utilized in a wide Uni V3 range. Lastly, funds raised from the proposed strategic funding round 2 could also be utilized for protocol owned liquidity if deemed inefficient. Inefficiency could be measured as GEAR beta (ie, volatility) relative to ETH, as too thin of liquidity creates high volatility that is undesirable for investors, holders, and contributors.

Note that token price scales with initial liquidity, ie if the initial token price is 0.045c (3x), then the initial liquidity will also be 3x ($13m).

4. Gnosis Batch Auction

Brief Overview

Docs are here: https://gnosis-auction.eth.limo/#/docs#topAnchor

A batch auction runs through a bidding system. Users deposit capital and bid a maximum GEAR price they would pay. At the end of the auction, the order book is analyzed to determine where the supply and demand curve intersect - this will be the GEAR clearing price. Bidders who specified a maximum price higher than the clearing price will receive GEAR tokens at the clearing price. There will be no whitelist.


Here are the proposed specs for a Gnosis Batch Auction from above, with context:

Parameter Value Justification
Auctioning Token 0xBa3335588D94035152 23F109EdC4eB7269a9Ab5D GEAR contract address
Bidding Token 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 USDC Contract Address. Will be converted to wETH for liquidity.
Sell Amount 150,000,000 GEAR Tokens 150 million GEAR tokens, see justification in section 4.
Minimum Buy Amount $0.015 x 150m GEAR Minimum buy amount is used to set the effective minimum sale price of $0.015. $0.015 is set to exceed the recent strategic round to account for the gnosis auction tokens being unlocked immediately after the sale.
Minimum Funding Threshold 0 There is no minimum, as any amount of POL will be beneficial. If the raise is low, POL can be supplemented with liquidity mining.
Order Cancelation End Time Start Date/Time plus 12 hours Give a short period of time for people to re-think their bids if they FOMO in at launch.
Auction End Time Start Date/Time plus 72 hours Auction will last 3 days, which means at least one weekday will be included.
Minimal Bidding-Amount Per Order 10000 Denominated in GEAR tokens, corresponding to a minimum of $150, higher if price is higher. Minimum amount is used to offset gas costs of clearing the option ($5-10 for token transfer for each bid)
Atomic Closure Allowance No (Unchecked) unecessary for an illiquid token
Whitelisting Process No (Unchecked) There is no advantage to having multiple addresses participate, so there is no need for a whitelist.
Miner Role Gnosis Auction Contract Auction needs the miner role to be able to send GEAR tokens to buyers before transferability is enabled.
Whitelist none There will be no whitelist


Graphic is assuming 100m tokens sold at $0.0125 min price (ie, not updated for current proposal of 150m tokens at $0.015 min price).

In the example above, we are selling 100m gear tokens at a minimum buy amount of 1.25m, which corresponds to a minimum buy price of $0.0125. The red curve is the supply curve, which is just the total supply (100m) multiplied by the price on the x axis. The blue curve is the demand curve, which represents the amount of capital willing to buy at each price (ie, 100% of committed capital is willing to buy at 0.0125c GEAR prices, because they have all bid at least that high).

The token sale price is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curve. In the example below, this results in $5m of total capital being willing to purchase GEAR at a price at or above $0.05, meaning they will all get GEAR at $0.05. The remaining committed capital will get nothing.

The min buy amount determines the minimum (reserve) price. So long as demand is less than supply, tokens will be sold at the minimum price. Once there are enough orders to buy the full supply, the sale price will begin to increase. More examples can be seen on individual pages for past auctions.


While there is no price cap, anyone buying in the batch auction will know that there is a much larger quantity of circulating supply out there. If the market is somewhat rational, this should limit the FOMO. Additionally, the fact that not every order gets filled means there will still be some remaining demand, as many users may be willing to reconsider their minimum purchase price when the token hits the open market.

Users can bid on prices, meaning they can set their own price cap personally. This creates an upper limit on price for individuals. The final token price is determined by the bidding, and everyone pays the same price (meaning you will pay your bid price or less, should the token price be under your bid price). This creates an equal token price for all (similar to Degenesis) but lets the market set that price.

Additionally, the fact the system already exists saves on dev resources.


There is no cap per wallet, meaning a few whales could in theory purchase the entire 1.5% sale of circulating supply - but they would also have to outbid everyone else in order to do so (thus are less likely to have exit liquidity as they fomo’d highest)

While dev resources are saved, the system itself is more complex and therefore may result in less participation or users not understanding what they are participating in.

A Note on Degenesis

In absence of anyone willing to take a grant to built the Degenesis style token sale (and get it approved by governance), Gnosis Auction is the path of least resistance with limited tradeoffs between the two. Degenesis could still be pursued if someone steps up to take charge of building it, but for now the Gnosis Auction only requires work from marketing and multisig, whereas Degenesis would also require front and back end dev work.

5. Liquidity Home

The proposed liquidity home is Balancer, due to potential partnerships that would let us accumulate an initial stake in Aura and then vote for and farm our own pools (which would also create additional liquidity). Additionally, bribing is more efficient than standard liquidity mining and is an option on Balancer/Aura (not an option for Uniswap), if more liquidity is needed for a period of time.

The full amount of funds raised from the gnosis auction will be paired with an equivalent value of GEAR from the DAO and used to seed the liquidity pool. The DAO also may propose to use an additional $500k worth of ETH from the community raise 2 for liquidity, after the Gnosis Auction has concluded.

Note that the liquidity pair is denominated in ETH as altcoins are still very correlated to ETH/BTC, moreso than USD. Denominating in USDC tends to lead to more potential IL in both directions as well as more missed upside if ETH is to continue its lifetime longterm upward trend.

There is an option to denominate liquidity in stETH or aWETH, which would result in 75% of Balancer revenue being recycled as bribes. However, this means GEAR liquidity is dependendent on another protocol (LIDO or AAVE). As liquidity for stETH or aWETH growth on Balancer, the DAO could consider switching to either of those for a liquidity base. For now, we will keep things simple and pair with wETH.

Prior to enabling transferability, the multisig may use a nominal amount of GEAR and WETH (<0.01) to seed a new 50/50 pool on balancer as a test deposit. Should that succeed, the multisig should queue and execute two transactions:

  1. Enable GEAR token transferability
  2. Seed a NEW 50/50 GEAR/WETH pool on Balancer, at the price matching the USD price at the end of the Gnosis Auction.

Note that the old pool shouldn’t be used as someone could in theory purchase the GEAR in this pool by routing through the internal balance, thus changing the price before liquidity is seeded.

Lastly, the Gearbox DAO will apply for a BAL gauge on Balancer.


Note: only change between this official proposal and the current draft with the discussion is clarification in a few places that still incorrectly labeled wETH as the bidding token (all gnosis auction sales will be done in USDC).

In response to: [OLD] GEAR Liquidity Raise and Token Transferability - #105 by Ceazor

This just encourages merch farmers that need to be offset by buyers that are hesitant bc they don’t know the value statement if the token. I think the vast majority of current farmers are ppl that believe in the system, or at least believe in the success. When the token is tradable, the only consideration for farmdumping is are the contracts solid, and is can the LP take the pressure.

Others have expressed that they don’t really want to deposit with uncertain reward value or even ability to sell. hard to say who is right on this one. If we don’t unlock, we probably lose some TVL. If we do unlock, some TVL probably stays in and stays mercenary. Given the LM program is short and not that many tokens, I don’t see it as a huge factor in the decision.

Obv, ppl want their apy, and they don’t want to be dragged along for long, and hype is a fire that burns fast. But if the LP can be quickly followed by at least staking for the share of fees that were for referrals, or some portion of that. People will have more metrics to consider risk of holding.

Everything is relative. Having no utility probably results in a lower token price than not having utility off the bad. I guess I’m not convinced that a higher short term price is worth it for potentially sharing paltry revenue - which comes with uncertain regulatory territory, risk of eroding runway, and dev resources. I also don’t understand why the market is so allergic to a simple metric of how much revenue the protocol earns, even if it does just sit in the treasury.

veTKNs are not a fool proof mechanic that will solve it. And veNFT are clearly superior. But these need to be considered carefully. Staking is almost a no brainer for this intitial phase assuming it’s not fed with inflation.

IMO veNFT / veTKNs are simply enhancers on the revenue share system. Without revenue or emissions (the latter gearbox does not have nor do we really need to pay ppl to hold the token with more tokens), ve doesn’t really do anything. If it was decided to share a tiny amount of revenue, then ve could be on the table for HOW to share that revenue.

Gear could also be used as a fee to access leverage. Paid as rewards to the supplies. Thus reducing inflation further.

This is kinda an interesting train of thought. I’m not sure if it’s better though. Borrowers already pay lenders directly - so what benefit does having two payment paths have? Is the intent that those with higher leverage should pay exponentially more vs someone with 2x leverage (rather than linear?). Ie, this feels similar to ve where it is more of moving things around rather than additive - but if we want to move things around to specific places and don’t like where they are right now we could certainly do that. THAT logic is I think where any good utility ideas would come from, if any (users of gearbox are doing THIS, and we really really want them to do THAT. Can we add GEAR token utility that guides them a bit more towards THAT, assuming THAT improves the protocol for as many / all parties as possible.)

Those are just some ideas off the top of my head there. But i would rather, personally, continue to hodl without any candles red or green while a clear understanding of the GEAR utility I’d developed and decided on.
What’s the concern with having liquidity if you plan to hold? Is it a concern about DAO using resources on this (selling tokens, holding POL), a concern of being pressured to sell, something else?

In general it’s about 1 year since v1 launch, there still haven’t been any serious efforts to add utility to GEAR (no in depth proposals, just ideas on discord). Are we willing to wait 1-2 years more? or does this vote look very similar 1-2 years from now, except gearbox has more PMF/revenue? I’ve yet to see a use case that I’m like “YES”, and therefore I’m yet to be convinced GEAR needs to be anything more than a governance token (i’m very wary of forced utility), with holders to some degree hoping that the industry matures to a point where revenue share may be acceptable, and non-negligible.


lets gogogogogo can’t disagree! Is time

My net is down, so I’m replying on mobile so I can’t quote.

Here are a few thoughts to yours

Building POL is the same as sharing the fees with token holders, except it has a 2nd benefit of allowing new investors to buy in. But this can also be achieved with bonds or OTC. POL is funded with (let’s say) ETH from treasury, and sellers will be able to extract that value, but pay a trading fee to do so, holders (assuming no LMining) are given nothing. Sure they get to vote, and govern, but shouldn’t these people be a priority for incentives. After all, they are the very people that provided to TVL.

Once the LP is built TVL will very likely increase, but new TVL will be dominated by merchs.

The securities concern is valid, and I have no idea on this…

I’m not saying that a veTKN model needs to deployed. Just a roadmap of what it likely to happen.

I don’t personally care about price action of gov tokens, I seldom do any swing trading or even pay attention to charts. But I do care about logical decisions.

With LP live.

You can still farm gear.(until this ends)
You can hodl your gear to vote.
You can sell your gear for ETH.(or usdx)
You can buy the token with no idea what it can do other than vote.

I highly doubt there will be any buying other then bot swing trading or whale donations. Especially with current market conditions. But I could be wrong.

Is the TVL an issue as things stand? I haven’t looked at metrics, is supply side TVL decreasing, more than what would be expected based on the FTX crap?

Here’s is a idea, instead of putting that ETH into POL, just vest it to the suppliers(GEAR farmers) That way there isn’t a race to sell the top of the POL. And people don’t need to choose to get that ETH OR maintain govern rights.and there is no securities concerns either.

That’s just a spit ball, but I highly doubt that anyone that wants the POL live wants it for any reason other than to sell into it.

Finally, I only started farmign GEAR since V2 and not with a crazy amount of it. So my thoughts are bias on this front. Some people have been farming for a long time, and putting in community work all that time, and deserve some “compensation”… I am also likely to have very little actual voting power to even push the needle. I haven’t even claimed my GEAR from the staking contract.

  • Personally, I think it’s perfect. Let’s do it together
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CAN not agree any more.Come on,let’s do it

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let’s make this happen, the market will tell us all.

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Plenty of good discussion points in here, I think a lot of them properly touch on why some may want to vote no vs yes, so I don’t really have counterarguments that haven’t been stated before and also agree that many of them are good considerations, and difficult to quantify.

one thing I would like to note → if a ton of people want to sell, why force them to hold? I’m not saying we shouldn’t, I’m asking for arguments for/against “ripping the bandaid off” so to say. Ie, that sell pressure does not go away, it just gets delayed by waiting longer to unlock. Why is or isn’t that better? I almost feel like it’s somewhat neutral.

TVL is good right now and has been pretty reflexive with CA demand - definitely somewhat propped up by GEAR incentives.

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Let’s do it,thank you for pushing it forward

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just start it ser,let DAO decide it

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This a brilliantly articulated proposal @ov3rkoalafied , and it undoubtedly took a significant amount of time to get to this point.

However I think everyone should be aware of this alternative: GEAR Strategy "curvebantegfkSBF"

Since both proposals are mutually exclusive, we should ponder them side-by-side. I expand on my reasoning in favor of the other proposal in the linked thread.

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The efficiency of DAO is too slow, I am not targeting anyone. A liquidity discussion has been going on for a month with no results. Reform still needs to be done

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Great update! I think it is a good time to launch. TVL will grow once the hype around the launch spreads across cryptotwitter discord/TG groups. GEAR as a governance token is good enough for now :slight_smile:

I have an idea about the utility of $GEAR, has it been discussed yet?

Utility: The credit line based on the amount of $GEAR locked.


  • Add an incentive to hold $GEAR
  • Add $GEAR locked as collateral to liquidate bad debts
  • TVL of $GEAR will naturally increase as the protocol grows (as total loan amount increases).
  • The more people who use a protocol, the more responsible they are for the health of the protocol.


  • capital efficiency (But, can we lower the borrowing rate from current rate?)
  • UX ( users will need to buy and lock in $GEAR)

In the meantime, I agree with making the tokens transferable. But I am trying to imagine if $GEAR could be a more effective governance token.

Hmm cool idea, basically if AAVE let you borrow off of stAAVE, is that right? Not sure if it makes sense for ppl to be able to get liquidated that are supposed to backstop the protocol from bad debt, so may not make sense as a combation. Just as first impression.

Ok caught up on discord/forums. Surprised the combined Cider and Koala idea has gotten minimal engagement, as it’s currently my favorite option. Discord

  1. GEAR holders send their tokens to a contract, expecting half to be sold to create liquidity tokens they will own
  2. 1/2 of GEAR is sold via gnosis auction, relevant parameters from this proposal (need to confirm it is in fact half - depends if bids over clearing price get extra tokens or a rebate)
  3. USDC sold for ETH, paired with remaining GEAR. DAO also gets $500 of ETH and GEAR to make baseline POL.
  4. [need technical input] LP tokens put in staking contract with LM program targeting about 50% of LP to remain at 20% APR (arguably LM takes at least 4 years to be less effective than POL, not really worth the immediate dilution?). Users can unstake their LP tokens at any time.

Cider outlines many great reasons his approach is better than the current GIP 32, so here’s what this compromise addresses specifically related to cider’s proposal:

  1. dao doesn’t have to decide clearing / sale price
  2. way easier technically (pending #5), so much less delay. May not need audit either, so less cost too.
  3. simpler for buyers to interact with, and due to gnosis auction “fair price” potential less voalitilty for LPers to interact with when liquidity launches (less race against bots). I’d argue this is actually an amazing use of gnosis’s fair price (let market determine fair price via gnosis auction without the current GIP32 forced holding, then let market continue to operate starting at that price)
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Why do people who want to sell need to be LPs? One of ivan’s DM members thinks that those who want to sell gear voluntarily send to the gnosis auction, and then return them ETH. This mixed solution is that no one provides liquidity, except DAO’s 500k

Ah yeah that is an option too. I misunderstood the initial idea. We can do no liquidity, then simply launch liquidity at the gnosis auction price. That def makes it easier to manage on both buyer and seller side. Perhaps we still take a small spread to kickstart LM.

Also LM can just be done with bribes so yeah actually maybe the lowest dev effort is to just give ppl back eth or gear, then seed liquidity with our own 500k + gear, and LM from there.

Issue is getting the pool rewards set up from day one, which is why classic lm may be necessary.

I’d like to summarize a couple points that are I think major considerations in which proposal is accepted:

  1. gnosis auction made more sense when market was healthy and regulatory risk was lower. The market is now far less healthy, and there is more regulatory fear due to various retroactive reinforcements with inconsistent and undefined laws related to crypto. The current regulatory landscape and market health lessens the argument for gnosis auction.

  2. gnosis auction has a price discovery mechanism that results in people setting their max price, and knowing that is the best case scenario. Cider’s method does the same, but IMO it is extremely important to present the UI as “THIS IS HOW MUCH GEAR YOU GET AT MAX PRICE” when you purchase, with “this is how much you get at current price” smaller and below it. Otherwise the UX mimics a problem that we identified early on - ppl buy at some price, than that price gets “higher” as you get closer to the end of the sale period.

  3. as I understand it devs are familiar with curve. If we used balancer it would cause delays. It’s unfortunate to miss out on that partnership, but ultimately if we aren’t using POL then it’s not a huge loss to lose some rewards (and emissions are still usually quite efficient). IMO eth should still be the liquidity base, fbp can be considered in the future.

  4. using cider’s approach DOES require users to LP but in a way that they can still exit, with a penalty, with only ETH prior to trading really happening. So a user can still see a → put in GEAR, get back ETH or put in ETH get back GEAR option. This will be largely UI driven to properly communicate the penalty of exiting prior to liquidity being enabled.

  5. gnosis auction is still a better pricing mechanism IMO, as only the minimum price needs to be set (cider approach needs to set min AND max), but the dilution may not be worth this one benefit.