[GIP-39/2] Liquidity and Liquidity Mining Update

Also FYI https://twitter.com/flashfish0x/status/1611307052285952001 50% of staking rewards may be go to balancer as fees.

we’d need to buy CRV first, whereas Aura has offered to send some votes our way in the beginning.

I think 80/20 pool makes sense when you need liquidity and also have a reason to pay ppl simply to hold your token (single-sided staking). Gearbox doesn’t need single sided staking, so I don’t think it makes sense to pay for liquidity that is mostly just the native token, even if it is relatively better for slippage than expected with 50/50 math (note: relatively better, still overall worse with same TVL).

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thats right but we could only benefit of owning CRV or why not make our own wrapper ? Curve DAO has been watching us and sure they will be happy to vote it in… same as sd/y CRV … what worries me is this “in the beginning” bit… we all mean good but we should really look for gearbox best interest … why are we not exploring Quest at Warden aka Palladin ? keep within CRV eco as we are already incentivizing a pool there …


I think you are right Citizen42, we should focus on gearbox interest as n.1 priority. It is business at the end of the story

We could explore them. I explored quest a while back but it didn’t have the necessary tools, I think it’s been updated. StakeDAO has been updated as well. You seem knowledgable, I don’t feel comfortable speccing out a full approach to bribing Quest or StakeDAO’s product vs votium for a multisig to follow. Can you give some insight into how exactly a Quest would be funded? (parameters, how often deposits are needed, etc?). I think votium is simple to start with because you just send your bribes in and you don’t really need to set any prices or anything, it will auto-distribute votes as necessary. veCRV ecosystem isn’t quite there yet as I understand, but it’s getting closer to having dependable solutions.

Proposal did not meet quorum, but this was PRE-GIP 42 where quorum was a bit tougher to achieve due to many moving their GEAR to the liquidity pool.

I’m putting the proposal up for vote again - if it doesn’t meet quorum again, then I’ll let it die.

I’m trying to figure out how this proposal should be executed in case of approval. It’s almost 2mo since GEAR/ETH LM started, so now there are only ~6.5M GEARs left from initial approved LM program and ~7.5M of Cider’ed rewards…

6.5+7.5=14 which is kind of ~15 :sweat_smile:

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Reporting back as a delegate on …e22 on my unusual vote:

I am fully against, but I wasn’t able to vote “no to all” so naturally had to choose: “do something else → only bribes no bal → except treasury → do all”. I am still confused by these multiple choice proposals outcomes and numbers, but anyway it doesn’t look this is hitting quorum.

Why I am against:

  1. A small treasury Gearbox DAO shouldn’t buy ETH at these levels. And it’s not even about trading decisions, it’s just that when cider program was being made - there was concern there would be close to 0 liquidity on GEAR. Current liquidity is in line almost with some DeFi semi-bluechips. There is no need to make it fatter, there is absolutely no upside (nor downside) in that. It’s a time-wasting action that only increases risks of runway of the DAO with no upside. See:

  1. Bribes and stuff won’t add that much, because things have repriced since when this proposal was made. Moreover, bribing all the time is a multisig-enduring requirement yet again. So again, even if this were to slightly improve things, it introduces hours or days of security-sensitive stuff at no benefit. Me no dev, but I could foresee this becoming a true burden every week. And for what result? The rewards in GEAR would then go not to community members (who now provide and LP + they can now vote thanks to [GIP-42] Accounting locked in Curve LP GEARs in DAO Governance) - but to bribes - nah… I don’t see benefit in that.

I am sorry to switch my opinion, I previously thought this was a good idea - but not convinced now. Moreover, the complexity of how the vote is structured makes things even harder.

Those delegates who disagree with me are free to directly vote themselves in this proposal or undelegate from …e22 completely. You can find that option in Snapshot


I think everything just needs to be pro-rated. Ie, try to maintain similar levels of proposed emissions to have an end date matching if the proposal had passed when first started (don’t tack on additonal time). If proposal passes I can update the numbers based on that. Thinking lightly about it I believe that would calc out.

It seems that the GEAR/ETH LPs really do not care for either 50% or 100%, liquidity hasn’t changed really. APY has been jumping a lot, but it seems like it has stuck to a number that is solid enough. I don’t think it’s warranted to make it higher, but also not lower. Hard to say where the sweet spot is.

Given that and how reluctant LPs are to the rate of Curve gauge rewards (with now CRV being the ample part of rewards!) I believe it’s warranted to use the same supply for a longer period - which was suggested in the vote (that didn’t get quorum twice due to the complex multichoice setup imho).

My suggestion would be:

  • Repurpose these same rewards to be for 6 months instead of 4. That will make GEAR APY technically drop by 1.5 times BUT it would still be well above 70% in total at current levels. Let’s say 50% in bad case scenario. That is more than enough to compensate for IL to LPs! It will also allow the DAO to not worry of liquidity during the Codename launch and delay this question to summer.

As for the other pointers that were in GIP-39/2, I have not strong preference. Bribing or not brining is not so obvious to me, so would suggest making a separate vote with those. For now, make a new GIP with the reward extension only, which is a very easy yes-no-abstain vote that Curve LPs (the chads in questions) can obviously vote in too, so their voices will be heard loud and clear.

Wdyt @ov3rkoalafied